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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ELIZABETH RUTH MUELLER, also 
known as ELIZABETH MULLER, BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
formerly known as ELIZABETH RUTH 
M. ALLEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
-vs- Appellate Case No. 20040208 - CA 
DAVID G. ALLEN and SUSAN S., District Court Case No. 020910005 
ALLEN. 
Defendants/Appellants. 
DEFEND ANTS/ APPELLANTS (hereinafter "Defendants" or "Aliens") submit the 
following as their opening brief in the above matter: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order herein, which is the Judgment on 
Special Verdict ("Verdict") in the trial court, dated February 27, 2004, is vested in the Utah Court 
of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated. §78-2a-3. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
The matter below is a civil proceeding seeking a judgment for money damages and the 
order appealed from is the Verdict in the trial court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented on appeal in this matter: 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant the motion of the Defendant, David G. 
Allen, for summary judgment based upon theories of res judicata and collateral estoppel arising 
out of the divorce proceeding between those parties9 Did the trial court lack subject matter 
jurisdiction? 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant the motion of the Defendant, David G. 
Allen, for summary judgment or to dismiss at the close of the Plaintiffs case, upon a theory that 
the Defendant, David G. Allen, could not commit a trespass upon property titled in his name, as 
a matter of law? Could Defendant Susan Allen trespass on her son's property if her conduct 
with regard to that property was with his permission? 
3. Did the trial court improperly instruct the jury as to the law regarding trespass? 
4. Is the jury's verdict so unsupported by the evidence that it cannot stand as a 
matter of law? Is this especially true of the punitive damages awarded? Are the punitive 
damages constitutional? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following may be dispositive: Utah Code Annotated § 78-18-1, The Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As to the first, second and third issues presented for rex iew. the Court should review this 
matter de novo for correctness. A trial court's conclusions of law in ci\ il cases are reviewed for 
correctness, and these matters concern the trial court's conclusions of law. United Park Citv Mines 
Co v. Greater Park Citv Co., 870 P.2d 880. 885 (Utah 1993); Society of Separationists. Inc. v. 
Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah 1993). 
As to the fourth issue presented for review, whether the jury's verdict is supported by the 
evidence, this Court owes broad deference to the fact finder, and its power to review a jury verdict 
challenged on the grounds of insufficient evidence is limited. In reviewing this challenge to a civil 
jury verdict, the appellate court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. 
Crookston v: Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 
769 (Utah 1985). However, in some circumstances, a reviewing court may a witness credibility if 
the testimony is inherently improbable. State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a civil verdict and award of judgment. The case arose in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and came to trial on January 27, 
28, 29 and 30, 2004. Prior to trial. Defendant David G. Allen brought a motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that the matter was res judicata in a divorce proceeding, which was 
denied (See final order). The trial court entered the order appealed from which is attached as 
Exhibit "A." 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. SUMMARY 
The parties to this action, plaintiff and defendant, David Allen, were previously husband 
and wife, but were divorced by a decree of divorce entered in the Third Judicial District Court. See 
Exhibit "B," decree of divorce. (Transcript of Jun Trial held January 27, 28, 29 and 30, 2004, 
Vol. 1, p. 20, lines 13-20). The original di\orce trial court ordered that certain real property of the 
couple be sqld. The Decree was admitted at trial as trial exhibit D-21. 
Plaintiff brought her complaint here in issue because she alleged impropriety in the way the 
land in issue was handled by her former husband, David Allen and his mother, Susan Allen. 
B. MARSHALING OF THE EVIDENCE 
Defendants are mindful of their obligation to this Court, in furtherance of some of their 
claims on appeal, to Marshall all of the evidence, and subsequently to argue the relative strength 
and merits of the evidence. Thus, Defendants assert that the following is a MARSHALING of all 
of the non-cumulative factual evidence adduced at trial, in furtherance of that obligation: 
1. * At the time of trial. Plaintiff had attended college for three years and was working 
toward a bachelor's degree in business finance. She was employed as a flight attendant (Tr. Vol 1, 
p. 18). 
2. Defendant David Allen ("David") had worked, "off and on" during the parties' 
marriage. (Tr. Vol 1., p. 21 lines 6-8). 
3. The plaintiff and David purchased real property on 13497 South 1300 West, 
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Riverton, Salt Lake County, State of Utah (hereinafter the "Property") on October 28, 1999 for 
approximately $130,000. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 99 lines 9-13). Plaintiffs mother-in-law. Defendant 
Susan Allen, had acted as the Plaintiffs real estate agent for the purchase of the Propem. She had 
waived her real estate commission at the time of purchase for the benefit of Plaintiff and David. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 101). Both Plaintiffs and David's names were on the title of the Propem, and the\ 
were co-owners. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 21). At the time the Plaintiff bought the Property, she was then 
about 20 or 21 years of age. While she was going through all of the transactions listed below, she 
was approximately 21 or 22 years of age. Prior to purchasing the Property, Plaintiff had never been 
a homeowner before, had never had a mortgage before, and had never been a landlord before. (Tr. 
Vol. 2, p. 98-99). It was also her husband, David's, first time through all of these experiences. At 
all relevant times, there were two mortgage liens encumbering the Property, both with Household 
Finance. There were monthly payments due for both these mortgages. While the parties were 
married to each other, and up until the time of their separation, they made the monthly payments 
out of a common bank account. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 22, lines 5-22). Prior to the separation of the 
parties, Plaintiff and David had alread> decided to sell the Property. They signed a listing contract 
with Defendant Susan Allen ("Susan") on April 10, 2001, to sell the Property. This listing contract 
eventually expired. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 102 lines 4-25). Eventuall), Plaintiff had signed three listing 
contracts with Defendant. Susan Allen, to sell the Propert). 
4. Plaintiff and David separated August 19. 2001. Plaintiff remained in the property 
for a time, "to keep it occupied so that we would be able to keep, the upkeep on it so that we could 
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try to find prospective buyers and to also take care of our dog. . . ." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 33 line through 
p. 34 line 7). Plaintiff remained in the property until approximate!} January 2, 2002. (Tr. Vol. 1, 
p. 34). During this time. Plaintiff had a roommate briefly in the property, a Courtney Mullein, who 
also had a dog, whom the Plaintiff did not charge rent. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 34 line 12 through p. 35 line 
10). The parties continued to make mortgage payments until December of 2001. After December, 
the Plaintiff made no mortgage payments on the Property, and she understood that Defendant. 
David, was not going to make any mortgage payments on either. (Tr. Vol. 1. p. 36). Plaintiff 
understood that, if the payments were not made, the mortgages would be foreclosed. 
5. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce entered between plaintiff and David, the parties 
were ordered to sell the Property, and any proceeds remaining would be divided evenly between 
them. (See Decree of Divorce attached as Exhibit "B", also introduced at trial). 
6. Susan was a realtor licensed in the State of Utah. The Plaintiff and David secured 
Susan's services to sell the Property pursuant to the Decree of Divorce (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 23 lines 2-
14). The Plaintiff and David signed a Listing Agreement with Susan. The Listing Agreement was 
also introduced at trial as Exhibit 1. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 24 lines 5-24). The first Listing Contract was 
signed April 10th of 2001. 
7. The Listing Contract, Exhibit P-l, stated that it was to expire September 9, 2001. 
Further, a box was checked on that document indicating that the property would not be made 
available to rent. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 25 line 12 through p. 26 line 5). Plaintiff did not want the property 
rented because it was her understanding "that a renter would actually hinder us from selling the 
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property . . . ." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 26 lines 8-13). 
8. A second Listing Agreement was signed between Plaintiff and David as sellers and 
Susan as a real estate agent. This Listing Contract was admitted at trial as Exhibit 2. That listing 
was to commence on September 22, 2001 and terminated on March 22. 2002. (Tr. Vol. 1. p. 27 
line 17 through p. 28 line 8). The same box was checked on Exhibit 2. indicating that the property 
was not available to rent under the Second Listing Agreement. (Tr. Vol. 1. p. 28 line 20 through p. 
29 line 6). 
9. Eventually, the parties signed a contract to sell the property to certain Defendants 
previously involved in this case, named Randy N. McCandless and Halene McCandless. The date 
of that contract was March 5, 2002. The contract was admitted at trial as Exhibit 3. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 
30). At the time she signed the contract to sell the property to the McCandlesses, Plaintiff knew 
nothing about the McCandlesses, other than that they were interested in buying the property. (Tr. 
Vol. 1, p. 31). The Contract for Sale, Exhibit 3, contained language stating, ''Buyer and Seller are 
both aware that this offer is contingent upon bank approval." The purchase price of the property in 
this contract was listed as $152,000. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 32). 
10. The fact that the Property was facing foreclosure due to non-payment of the 
mortgages in 2002 was "a big concern" to the Plaintiff. She was worried about her credit, and did 
not want her credit to be ruined. She wanted "to find some buyers and get it sold so that we could 
go our separate ways without having any repercussions in that way." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 37 lines 3-10). 
11. Prior to the offer of March. 2002. prospecth e buyers had come by and looked at the 
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house, but no offers had been received. Up to March of 2002, Plaintiff was satisfied with Susan's 
efforts to sell the Property. (Tr. Vol. 1. p. 37 line 15 through p. 38 line 7). Up to the point in time 
when the McCandlesses bought the Property (on December 15. 2002), Plaintiff herself never found 
another qualified buyer for the Property. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 149 lines 13-18). 
12. At the time the offer was received from the McCandlesses in March of 2002, no 
mortgage payments had been made for Januaiy, February or March. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 38 lines 8-23).. 
13. When she signed the Real Estate Purchase Contract, admitted as Exhibit 3, Plaintiff 
expressed to Susan that Plaintiff was concerned about the Propert}. about her credit, and about the 
Property going into foreclosure because of non-payment. She inquired about putting renters into 
the Property, as an option to avoid foreclosure. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 40 line 19 through p. 41 line 12). At 
that time, Susan recommended against renting the Property. 
14. Plaintiff contends that she and David had one other conversation regarding the 
rental of the Property, which occurred after March of 2002. In that call. Plaintiff expressed an 
interest in finding some renters since the parties weren't making the payments on the Property and 
she did not want the house in foreclosure. At that time. David objected to renting the Property. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 41 line 20 through p. 42 line 11). From the perspective of Susan Allen, she 
understood Elizabeth Mueller to be instructing her to find a tenant for the Property by March of 
2002 because: "she [Plaintiff] wanted to be collecting rent." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 302 line 3 through p. 
304). (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 321 line 9 through p. 322 line 12). 
15. Eventually, the loan sought by the McCandlesses pursuant to the March 5, 2002 
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contract (Exhibit 3) was denied. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 42 lines 12-17). On about April 5. 2002. 
Defendant, David, signed a Residential Rental Agreement with the McCandlesses. introduced at 
trial as Exhibit 4. The Residential Rental Agreement rented the propert} to the prospecthe buyers. 
Mr. and Mrs; McCandless. The rental contract was signed onl> b\ David. (Tr. Vol. 1. p. 43-44). 
It was faxed to Plaintiff by Susan on April 5, 2002. Plaintiff testified that, prior to April 5. 2002. 
Susan never told the Plaintiff there was going to be a tenant in the Propert}. Susan never asked 
Plaintiff if Plaintiff agreed to have a tenant in the Property. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 45 lines 7-16). Despite 
her previous conversations with Susan and David inquiring about the possibility of renting the 
Property to forestall a foreclosure, Plaintiff denied at trial that she had ever given anyone 
authorization to put a tenant in the Property. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 45 lines 14-16). On April 5, 2002, 
Plaintiff had a conversation with Susan about the McCandlesses moving into the Property as 
tenants. This conversation was recorded by Plaintiff without the knowledge of Susan. A tape 
recording of the conversation was introduced at trial as Exhibit 19. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 48). In the 
course of that conversation, Susan Allen offered to Plaintiff to get the McCandlesses out of the 
Property. During that conversation. Plaintiff did not instruct Susan Allen to go forward with that 
offer of assistance. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 129 lines 14-22). 
16. On the evening of April 6, 2002, Plaintiff and a friend went to the Property to 
observe if the McCandlesses had moved into the Propert}. and to talk to them and to see what 
their understanding of the rental agreement might be. She spoke with Randy McCandless. She 
observed Randy McCandless and another male moving a refrigerator or freezer into the garage. 
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She informed Mr. McCandless verbalh that she had not signed the rental agreement and did not 
agree with the rental contract. Mr. McCandless informed Plaintiff that he had believed Plaintiff 
agreed to the contract. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 50-51). 
17. After April 5. 2002, Plaintiff returned to the Property approximately three times. 
The first time is as described above. The second occasion occurred on April 8, 2002, when 
Plaintiff went to the property with her father. Rhinehard Mueller. On that occasion. Plaintiff 
observed that there were two males on the Propert) chasing a goat. During that \ isit, Halene 
McCandlessadvised Plaintiff that she had paid SI .400 to Da\ id Allen for the rental of the Property 
on April 5th, by giving a check to Susan Allen. It appeared to Plaintiff that the McCandlesses had 
fully moved into the Property. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 54, 55, 56). As of that point in time. Plaintiff was 
unaware of any other contract for the McCandlesses to purchase the Property and unaware that the 
McCandlesses might qualify for a loan to buy the Property. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 57 lines 9-20). 
Eventually, in late April 2002, Plaintiff engaged in a telephone conversation with Susan and with a 
representative of the mortgage lien holder. Household Finance, in which it was agreed that $550.00 
of this first rent payment would be applied to forestall foreclosure proceedings. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 67, 
68). 
18. Halene McCandless learned that Plaintiff had \ isited her home on the day the 
McCandlesses moved in, ". . . and that she wasn't very pleasant." However, the McCandlesses did 
not learn that Plaintiff was not agreeable to the rental agreement until after August, 2002. In fact, 
Halene McCandless described standing in the kitchen of the Propert)' and discussing the cabinets in 
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a "very pleasant" conversation during which Elizabeth Mueller said nothing about McCandlesses 
vacating the Property. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 195 line 12 through p. 196 line 11). 
19. The third occasion on which Plaintiff went to the Property was approximately one 
month after the second, placing the incident at about May 8. 2002. Plaintiff went to the Property to 
pick up her washer and dryer. She observed a horse on the Property and two dogs running on the 
Property. Plaintiff understood the Property to be a "horse property," consisting of approximately 
one acre. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 58 line 6 through p. 59 line 12). Plaintiff was of the opinion that it might 
be a selling point for the Property, the fact that it contained an acreage and the fact that somebody 
could keep animals on the Property. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 121 lines 8-21). On one other occasion. 
Plaintiff went to the Property and knocked on the back door asking to inspect the Property. 
Plaintiff was denied access to the Property by Halene McCandless. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 59-60). Halene 
McCandless,-referred Plaintiff to Susan Allen, and Plaintiff did not go to speak to Susan Allen 
about this incident. 
20. On April 26, 2002, Plaintiff was presented with another real estate purchase 
contract, eventually admitted at trial as Exhibit 6. She signed that contract. This contract also 
called for the sale of the Property to the McCandlesses. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 61-62). Plaintiff testified 
that her ". . . ultimate number one goal was to sell the Property and Rick [a loan officer] had told 
me in the conversation that their loan was approved, and that they had been approved for this 
amount, and it was going to go through, all the}' needed from me was my signature to get that 
complete and my ultimate goal, like 1 said, was to sell the Property and save our credit." (Tr. Vol. 
15 
1, p. 62 lines 17-22). David Allen also signed the Contract. This offer was also contingent upon 
"bank approval." 
21. The purchase price for the new contract for sale of the Property was $160,000. The 
contract called for the seller "to pay up to 6% of purchase price in closing costs for the buyer." (Tr. 
Vol. 1, p. 64 lines 9-25). This contract contained a closing deadline of May 2, 2002. 
22. The McCandlesses were again declined for a loan. Plaintiff discovered this fact by 
hearing about it from the mortgage lien holder. Household Finance. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 65 lines 9-24). 
23. After the two contracts for sale of the Propert> pre\ iously described had fallen 
through, Plaintiff wrote a complaint to the Utah State department licensing realtors, complaining 
about the conduct of Susan Allen. That letter of complaint was introduced at trial as Exhibit 8. 
Plaintiff faxed the document to the Utah Division of Real Estate. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 71 lines 1-12). In 
this letter, Plaintiff accused Defendant Susan of, among other things, not turning "the rental money 
into her broker's trust account." Plaintiff understood that a complaint to this agency could impact 
Susan's license to practice her profession. Regarding her professional license. Plaintiff said, 'Tm 
assuming if they can give it, they could take it away." At the bottom of that complaint document to 
that agency,(Plaintiff hand wrote three particular sentences. In the first sentence, she said "I never 
signed the listing agreement." In fact, this was an inaccurate statement, in that Plaintiff had 
previously signed two listing agreements for the Property with Susan. The next handwritten 
sentence on the document says: "I never authorized the Property to be rented." The document did 
not specify that it was David Allen, and not Susan Allen, who had signed the rental contract. The 
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third sentence stated: "Susan has not turned the rental money into her broker's trust account." She 
made this accusation, though the rental contract called for the rental mone\ to be paid to the 
"landlord" on the contract (David Allen) and to be divided between Plaintiff and David, pursuant 
to the Decree of Divorce. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 124-127). 
24. '- Shortly thereafter. Plaintiff also caused a demand letter to be sent from her lawyer, 
Mr. Gary Weston (admitted at trial as Exhibit 10) to Susan Allen, David Allen, and Coldwell 
Banker Premium Realty (Susan Allen's employer). (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 74). In that letter. Plaintiff 
complained to Susan's employer that the last listing agreement had expired in December of 2001. 
(It had actually expired in the spring of 2002) In the letter, she t miplaincil that Susan had given 
occupancy of the Property to the McCandlesses. In fact, Plaintiffs former husband had signed the 
lease agreement with the McCandlesses. In that letter. Plaintiff accused Susan of violating the 
terms and conditions of her license as issued b> the State of Utah. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 137-139). In this 
letter, Plaintiff accused Susan Allen personally of "converting" the rental money. She further 
directed Susan's employer that Susan should give written notice to the McCandlesses to vacate the 
Property. Susan Allen never had any interest in the property whatsoever. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 142). 
25. Eventually, the Property was sold successfully to Randy N. and Halene 
McCandless. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 128, lines 16-20). As a consequence of that sale, Plaintiff did not 
receive any money. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 76 lines 2-23). Plaintiff quit-claimed the Property to David to 
accomplish the sale. At no time did either Defendant Allen offer to assist Plaintiff in evicting the 
McCandlesses from the Property, nor did the\ pa\ Plaintiff am rent on the Propert}. 
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26. By the time the Plaintiff had signed the first sales contract with the McCandlesses. 
the Property had been on the market for a total of eleven months. The list price had been dropped 
from $175,000 to $165,000 (and two listings had expired at those respective prices). By the time 
of the first McCandless contract. Plaintiff had been out of the Property for at least three months, 
and the Property was at least three months in arrears on the mortgage. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 105-106). In 
addition to arrearages in the first and second mortgage, Plaintiff and Defendant David owed back 
property taxes on the Property, and Plaintiff wanted to t%sell it as soon as possible " By March 
of 2002, Plaintiff recognized that she was not likely to recover any money out of the sale of the 
Property. She was ". . . willing to sell it for a base price to get the mortgage just taken care of and 
sold and over with, without having any equity, and we would sell it just to get the mortgage paid 
off and we were fine with that, I was fine with that." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 107 lines 1-4). 
27. By March of 2002, when she had reached this mental state, Plaintiff understood that 
she and David owed a balance on the first mortgage of about $135,000, a balance on a second 
mortgage of about $15,000, and at least $1,000 in back property taxes. Plaintiff and David also 
owed a remaining balance for a water bill associated with the Property, and she also understood 
that there would be closing costs affiliated with any sale. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 107). By the time Plaintiff 
accepted the McCandlesses first offer in March 2002, Plaintiff understood that the first and second 
mortgage lender. Household Finance, would have to agree to a "short sale" in order for the sales 
price offered by the McCandlesses to relieve Plaintiff and David from the mortgage obligations. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 108 lines 7-22). There was a pre-payment penalty for at least one of the mortgages. 
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which Household Finance would also have to forgive, in order to resolve the Plaintiffs economic 
circumstances at a sales price of $160,000. 
28. By March of 2002, Plaintiff was conveying to Susan that Plaintiff". . . wanted to 
sell the Property and have it sold and have it so that the mortgage compam was also happy with 
the agreement, however, that would be made.'" (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 110 lines 1-3). She also gave 
instructions to Susan that she wanted the Propert} sold without a foreclosure. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 110 
lines 9-11). 
29. Plaintiff testified at one point in time, that it was her understanding the "bank 
approval'* referenced in the sales contract which would have to be obtained for sale of the Property, 
was the approval of her own bank. Household Finance, to discount their mortgage in order to close 
the sale. Plaintiff understood that there was some potential problem with Household Finance not 
dealing with them on this issue, and she testified: "1 knew that the) would have to work with us, 
that's for suite." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. I l l lines 3-14). 
30. I 'rior to vacating from the Property, the Plaintiff stopped making utility payments. 
The utilities were turned off when she moved out in Januarv of 2002. Plaintiff testified that her 
father came over to the Property and "winterized" everything, and that she assisted I i i i loing 
that. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 112 lines 4-24). At the point when she vacated the Property, the roof needed to 
be replaced, and the real estate purchase contract disclosed that fact. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 113 lines 7-
23). In fact, Plaintiff described the fact that the roof needed to be replaced as ^obvious." It was 
also Plaintiffs belief that this "obvious" problem with the roof was one of the problems with 
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getting a buyer for the Property. It was obvious from a dri\ e-b\ inspection from the street that the 
roof needed replacement. 
31. The combined monthly mortgage payments for the propert} had been approximate!) 
$1,400 per month. The parties had had difficulty making the mortgage payment when the two of 
them were living together as husband and wife. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 114 lines 3-15). 
32. By August of 2002, Plaintiff had never stated directly to Defendants Randy or 
Halene McCandless, either verbally or in writing, or to Susan Allen, that she wanted the 
McCandlesses to move out of the Property. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 132-133). By this point in time. 
Plaintiff had formed the opinion that there was nothing she could do gain possession of the 
Property, absent the assistance of an attorney. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 93 lines 1-9). 
33. No matter what any contract in this situation called for, Susan never actually 
charged a commission to Elizabeth and David Allen for the purchase of the Property, nor did she 
charge the Plaintiff and David Allen a commission for the ultimate sale of the Property. (Tr. Vol. 
2, p. 135, lines 2-15). 
34. This lawsuit was filed by Plaintiff against four Defendants on September 22, 2002. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 168 lines 3-6). 
35. The McCandlesses were eventually able to qualify for purchase of the Property by 
raising the original sales offer price from $152,000, to enable them to qualify for a loan at a certain 
percentage of sales price, but to stay with their final mortgage balance of $152,000. In order to 
enable this purchase finally to take place. Defendant Susan Allen and her husband came up with 
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$14,000 of their own money and paid it in at closing, out of their own pocket. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 148 
line 18 through p. 149 line 12). 
36. The sale of the Property actually happened in December of 2002. That sale did, in 
fact, relieve Plaintiff and her former husband from the first and second mortgage obligations on the 
Property, from the back property taxes owing on the Propern. and rehexed both of them from 
having a foreclosure on their credit report. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 154 lines 11-25). Susan never had any 
obligation to pay the mortgages on the Property. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 155 lines 1-10). In order to 
accomplish this arrangement, both mortgages on the Property had to be discounted, and the 
mortgage company had to agree to forgive its pre-payment penalty. This arrangement was 
negotiated in behalf of Plaintiff and David by Susan. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 155 line 11 through p. 156 line 
16). 
37. From the McCandlesses* perspective, they mo\ed into the Property on April 5, 
2002, pursuant to a written rental agreement signed by David Allen, as referenced above. Their 
household included former Defendants Randy N. and Halene McCandless (husband and wife), 
their daughter, her husband, and the McCandless' grandson. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 169 line 12-21). Both 
the McCandlesses were employed, with Halene McCandless having worked for CR England 
Trucking Company for seven years at the time of trial, and Randy McCandless having worked for 
Sara Lee Bakery for 26 years as of the time of trial. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 170 lines 1-12). The 
McCandlesses had previously been renting an acreage in Riverton. They drove by the Property one 
day and saw the "For Sale" sign. The\ called Susan at the number on the sign. That was the first 
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time they had met Susan. They met her at the Propert), inspected the Propert). and offered to buy 
it. (Tr. Vol.,2, p. 172 lines 5-25). 
38. After offering to purchase the Property for SI52.000. the McCandlesses contacted a 
loan officer at MGM through a newspaper ad. They tried to obtain FHA financing for the Propert). 
but "the roof would not go." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 175 lines 8-13). About a week before the closing date 
on the first contract, Halene McCandless contacted Susan Allen and told Susan Allen that the 
McCandlesses had been denied a loan because they couldn't **go FHA" because of the roof on the 
home not being approved. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 176 lines 9-24). The McCandlesses were worried 
because their former residence in Bluffdale was being demolished, and the)' needed to move 
immediately. They had located another place to move in West Valley, Utah. They were going to 
buy the West Valley property, with a lease and option to purchase after one year. However, the day 
before they were supposed to sign on the West Valley home, Susan called Halene McCandless and 
told Ms. McCandless about a Rick Curtis who would be able to do a loan for the Property. Ms. 
McCandless testified that Mr. Curtis "\ . . pretty much guaranteed both of us that he could get the 
loan to go through and that he'd talked to David and Liz about us renting the house until the 
Property went through and we didn't want to really live in West Valley. We wanted to live in 
Riverton where we had been." Based upon this, the McCandlesses rented the Property. (Tr. Vol. 
2, p. 177). The rental for the Property of $1.400 per month was suggested to the McCandlesses by 
Susan, as a little higher than they had paid at their last propert). (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 179 lines 2-13). 
Halene McCandless met David Allen at the Property the night before the McCandlesses moved in 
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to sign the rental agreement and "pay him the mone\. . . ." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 181 lines 21-25). When 
Halene McCandless signed the rental agreement for the Property, she understood, from her 
conversation with Rick Curtis, that she and her husband were going to quality for a loan to 
purchase the Property within thirty days, and that they could close on the house. She did not 
understand what would occur after thirty days, if she and her husband were unable to close on the 
Property. Halene McCandless did know that the rental agreement was the first which had ever 
been written by Defendant Susan Allen, since Susan Allen disclosed to Halene McCandless that 
this was the first time she had ever filled out a rental agreement form. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 189 line 20 
through p. 190 line 25). Mr. McCandless was not present at the time the lease agreement was 
executed and never signed the rental agreement. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 192 lines 7-15). 
39. The McCandlesses clearly understood that both the Plaintiff and David owned the 
home and that each had an undivided one-half interest in the home. The McCandlesses understood 
that they were divorced and that the house needed to be sold. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 178 lines 10-22). 
40. The McCandlesses were interested in the Property because it was the horse property 
they had been looking for. They inspected the home and knew it was an older home. They knew 
the roof needed repair. They were unwilling to pay more than $152,000 for the Property, in its 
condition, and ". . . that's how it's been the whole time." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 180 lines 9-19). 
41. At the point when she was ready to move into the Property, Halene McCandless 
went to the City of Riverton to have the water turned on, but was told there was an outstanding bill. 
She testified either Susan Allen or David Allen paid it, because Halene McCandless was then able 
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to have the water turned on. When she returned to the house from having the water connected, a 
pipe burst and flooded the whole kitchen. "It was dripping e\er\ where." Halene VlcCandless had 
to go to the neighbor next door who came over and turned the water off so that it would quit 
flooding. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 182 lines 6-20). 
42. The McCandlesses signed an agency disclosure agreement on March 2, 2002 with 
Susan Allen, which was introduced at trial as Exhibit 14. This disclosure agreement appointed 
Susan Allen as the McCandless' realtor, and required the McCandlesses to pay Susan Allen a 
commission for the purchase of the Property. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 187 line 2 through p. 188 line 6). 
43. After the McCandlesses moved into the Property, they executed another real estate 
purchase contract on about April 27, 2002. (Exhibit 6 at trial). When they executed this contract, 
the McCandlesses knew that the first loan had been disapproved. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 196 lines 12-24). 
The McCandlesses increased the offer on the Property from the original of $152,000 to $160,000, 
"for the loan." Ms. McCandless understood that this increase in the purchase price was necessary 
so that the loan would go through. However, Ms. McCandless understood that she would still have 
to have 100% financing of the $152,000 she would undertake as a loan for the Property. (Tr. Vol. 
2, p. 198 lines 1-24, p. 199 lines 14-19). The McCandlesses did not understand, at the time of the 
second real estate purchase contract, that there would be any problem with obtaining a loan due to 
their credit. -Ms. McCandless understood that the reason the first loan had been denied was 
because they had tried for an FHA loan, and the Property would not qualify for such a loan because 
of the condition of the roof. "It had nothing to do with our credit then." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 200 lines 
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11-19). 
44. The McCandlesses found out about problems with their credit about a month or six 
weeks after the second loan application, when they found out that the second application had been 
denied. Rick Curtis, the mortgage broker, advised Ms. McCandless of the loan denial. However, 
when the second loan application was denied. Mr. Curtis "just said that he knew he could get it 
through this other company. That's how it went for even- time." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 201 lines 2-17). 
45. The McCandlesses continued to remain in the Property after two loan applications 
:>een declined bIs McCandless kept being told that "he was certain that we could get" the 
loan. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 233 lines 14-18). However, Defendant Susan never assured the McCandlesses 
that they would get a loan (Tr Vol. 2. p. 233 lines 19-21). The Mc( andlesses did not even 
unpack their boxes until Christmas Day of 2002, almost nine months after they moved into the 
Property. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 201 lines 18-25). Every time the loan applications were disapproved, the 
McCandlesses would talk to their loan officer. Rick, and "Rick talked to Sue." The McCandlesses 
did not speak directly to Sue about this problem. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 202 lines 1 -9). 
46. In the meantime, the McCandlesses had made the one rental payment of $1,400 on 
April 5th. They handed the first payment to Susan, and the remaining payments to David. (Tr. Vol. 
2, p. 202 lines 10-17). They made no rental payments in May, June, July or August. The 
McCandlesses paid an additional $2,800 rent in September. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 203 lines 8-19). 
Though the McCandlesses did not pay rent for May. June. July or August. Ms. McCandless 
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perceived that t%we did stuff to the house." (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 204 lines 19-25). It is clear that Ms. 
McCandless believed she was entitled to some offset of the rent b\ reason of the condition of the 
house. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 225 lines 6-11) and (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 239 lines 2-9). 
47. For example, a few weeks after they moved in, the McCandlesses endured a 
situation where numerous repairs had to be made to the Property. The sump pump went out, a 
downstairs shower was leaking through the wall, and the ceiling fell into the kitchen from roof 
and water damage. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 204 lines 4-25). Water leaked down the coal chute, so that Mr. 
McCandless had to dig out around the foundation and cement it all in. Trees fell in the backyard. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 205 lines 1-8). Mr. McCandless paid for the roof repair and provided the labor to 
repair the roof. The yard needed to be totally retained and landscaped. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 205 lines 11-
17) and (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 277 line 10 through p. 286). 
48. Susan never told the McCandlesses that the) did not have to pay rent. (Tr. Vol. 2, 
p. 225 lines 2-3). 
49. On July 30, 2002, the McCandlesses learned that the Property was in foreclosure 
because a notice was taped to the door. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 207 lines 9-17). One of the foreclosure 
notices was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 7. 
50. Eventually, in August 2002. Plaintiff caused her attorney to send a letter to the 
McCandlesses. That letter was introduced at trial as Exhibit 9. The McCandlesses did not respond 
to Plaintiff or to her attorney, but Ms. McCandless did tell Susan of the letter and did tell her loan 
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officer. Rick Curtis. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 221 line 5 through p. 222 line 14). Ms. McCandless did not 
respond to the letter because Rick Curtis had told her he would get in touch with Plaintiffs 
counsel. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 223 lines 8-18). Mr. Curtis was still telling Ms. McCandless that "things 
were going in order" and that the McCandlesses were going to be able to purchase the Property. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 230 lines 14-23). 
51. Officially, Elizabeth Mueller caused the McCandlesses to be served with a notice to 
pay delinquent rent or to quit possession on August 23, 2002. The notice to pay rent or quit was 
introduced at trial as Exhibit 15. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 226 lines 4-21). By this point, Ms. McCandless 
did not perceive that she was dealing with anyone about the house other than David. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 
228 lines 1-25 through p. 229 line 10). At this time, the McCandlesses still wanted to buy the 
Property. After the McCandlesses were served with the notice to vacate or quit, the McCandlesses 
had a conversation with David. He came by in early September to pick up a rent payment, and was 
informed by the McCandlesses that they were still trying to buy the house and that David still 
should not lu\ t (IK house go into foreclosure. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 229 lines 18-23). 
52. The McCandlesses were still being told by Rick Curtis that "he was trying to take 
care of it all." (Tr. '/ol. 2, p. 230 lines 18-23). However, Halene McCandless agreed that, if Sue 
Allen or David Allen had ever told her that she hadn't paid rent, and that it didn't look like the loan 
was going to go through, she would have moved out. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 233 lines 1-7). 
53. Eventually, David requested another rental payment from the McCandlesses, which 
occurred on November 29, 2002. On that occasion, the McCandlesses paid David another $1,400 
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in rent. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 239 lines 10-25). By November 29th, the McCandlesses were still telling 
David that they wanted to buy the house and that they did not want it to go into foreclosure. (Tr. 
Vol. 2, p. 241 lines 6-20). By that point, the McCandlesses had been served with this lawsuit, on 
about October 2nd. 
54. The third offer was not prepared by Susan Allen. It was prepared by David at the 
direction of his mortgage lender, and Susan was not involved with that process. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 345 
line 15 through p. 346 line 11). 
55. When the McCandlesses finally purchased the Property in December of 2002, the 
McCandlesses signed a "HUD Settlement Statements This was introduced at trial as Exhibit 11. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 244 lines 4-25). The closing of the Property occurred at Bachman Stewart Title 
Company. Present at the closing were the two McCandlesses, Defendants David Allen and Susan 
Allen, and the escrow closing officer. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 245 lines 1-22). The escrow agent was Susan 
Allen's relative, who worked for the title company. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 271 lines 6-23). This closing 
was conducted pursuant to yet another real estate sales contract, the one prepared by David, which 
was introduced at trial as Exhibit 20, and dated November 25, 2002. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 246 lines 1-
25). According to Ms. McCandless' understanding, the sales price was increased to $169,700, so 
that the loan would go through. Ms. McCandless understood that she would still have to pay 
$152,000 for the house. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 247 lines 1-25 through p. 248 line 17). Ms. McCandless 
understood that the purchase price and the total arrangement came from the suggestion of Rick 
Curtis, the loan officer. Exhibit 20, the HUD Closing Statement, talked about seller financing in 
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the amount of $8,185.00. The McCandlesses were to recehe a mortgage loan for $152,750. (See 
Exhibit 20). Sue Allen waived all commissions, despite her contracts entitling her to receive 
commissions. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 251 lines 2-13). No assessment for back rent appears on the 
settlement statement. Ms. McCandless understood that, with the closing, "we don't owe them am 
money. We bought the house. There was no money owed at all." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 252 lines 4-16). 
In conjunction with the closing, the McCandlesses executed a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note, 
introduced at trial as Plaintiffs Exhibits 17 and 18. Pursuant to the Trust Deed Note, the 
McCandlesses owed David G. Allen $8,485 (clearly for the seller financing referenced in the HUD 
Closing Statement, Exhibit 20). However, Ms. McCandless expressed her understanding at trial 
that she did not actually have to pay this amount, based on statements made to her by David. (Tr. 
Vol. 2, p. 253 lines 1 through p. 255 line 23) and (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 255 lines 4-23). The HUD 
settlement sheet also called for the buyers to bring $ 14,108.19 to the closing. (This was 
accomplished by the cashier's check from the Aliens.) (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 265 line 3 through p. 266 
line 23). Specifically, a check was made payable to Rand} McCandless from MCA Construction, 
Inc. in the amount of $14,100 dated December 16, 2002. It was introduced at trial as Exhibit 16. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 261 line 16 through p. 263 line 25). This money was given to the McCandlesses by 
the Aliens, and the McCandlesses in turn took these funds to closing. The McCandlesses never 
fully understood why they received the check for $14,100 from Susan and her husband. (Tr. Vol. 
2, p. 267 lines 2-25). The HUD statement also provided that property taxes due for 2001 and 2002 
would be paid, in the sums of $1,421.00 and $1,248.00, respectively. There was also a past due 
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assessment of the South Valley Sewer District for a water bill, and that was also collected at the 
time of the closing. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 276). 
56. During the conversations that the McCandlesses had with Plaintiff. Plaintiff had 
occasion to tell Mrs. McCandless that she hated her ex-husband David, and that the only person 
she hated more than David was his mother. Susan Allen. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 296 lines 5-10). 
57. During a substantial portion of the time that the McCandlesses were attempting to 
qualify for a mortgage, Susan was not aware of their financial inability to qualify for a mortgage. 
In fact it was Susan's understanding at the time of their first application that the McCandlesses had 
already pre-qualified for a mortgage with a person named Mike at MTM mortgage. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 
304 line 10 through p. 305 line 12). 
58. During all of the ordeal of attempting to have the McCandlesses qualify to purchase 
the Property; Susan and her son, David, continued to work with the McCandlesses because theirs 
was "the only offer" and their attempts to purchase the Property were "the best bet." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 
343 line 14 through p. 344 line 2). 
59. On the very last contract and transaction which resulted in the sale of the Property, 
Susan Allen was not the real estate agent. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 349). 
60. As an explanation of her damages, Plaintiff introduced summary exhibits at trial, 
including enlarged exhibits 12 and 13. From those exhibits. Plaintiff testified to a summary of her 
damages in the case as follows: she wanted to collect from Defendants David Allen and Susan 
Allen $700.00 per month as rent for the Property for April. May, June, July, August, September, 
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October, November, and December. 2002. through December 15th. (On December 15th. the 
McCandlesses purchased the Property). Plaintiff wanted to recover these funds, less $275.00 
advanced to Household Finance from the Defendants. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 144 line 4 through p. 146 line 
7). The total amount claimed by Plaintiff for rental was $5,581.00. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 147 lines 15-
24). In addition to back rent, Plaintiff claimed in her summary of damages that she should receive 
one-half the "equity" in the real property of $25,895.00, pursuant to the Decree of Divorce between 
herself and David Allen. However, Plaintiff also agreed that the "equity" would not have existed 
but for Susan Allen and her husband bringing $14,000 to the closing, and that, with regard to this 
$14,000, "they should get paid back." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 149 line 25 through page 150 line 19). 
Within minutes, however, Plaintiff also testified that she did not feel the $14,000 brought to the 
closing was her responsibility. She felt the agreement that David, his parents and the 
McCandlesses had was between them, and that she was not involved with that. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 153 
lines 12-21). Effectively, Plaintiff testified that she did not have any responsibility to save her own 
property from foreclosure and to save her own credit rating. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The verdict and instructions to the jury are in error. Defendant, David Allen, cannot have 
trespassed on his own land, as a matter of law, and his mother cannot have trespassed, since she 
acted with David's permission. 
The Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case, and this case was estopped 
because the matter should have been heard as an enforcement of the divorce action between 
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Plaintiff and David Allen. 
The jury verdict is not supported by the evidence in this case. The punitive damage award 
is especially egregious in this regard, and is so excessive as to be unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE PLAINTIFF COULD NOT RECOVER AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
FOR TRESPASS, AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Utah law states that "the essential element of trespass is physical invasion of the land; 
'trespass is a possessory action.'" Walker Drug Company, Inc. v. La Sal Oil Company, 972 P.2d 
1238, 1243 (Utah 1998) (quoting John Price Assoc, Inc. v. Utah State Conf. 615 P.2d 1210, 1214 
(1980) ("The gist of an action of trespass is infringement on the right of possession.")). Included in 
this right of possession is the right to exclude. 
The present case is similar to cases where a landowner has sued the owner of an easement 
because both parties own certain interests in the same piece of property. Moreover, the dispute 
here arises over what rights the parties have in regard to each other. Easements are limited to the 
terms of the contract between the parties that may say what the easement can be used for or that 
only certain people may use the easement. In other situations the owner of the easement may have 
unlimited rights regarding the easement. 
In Broadbent Land Company \. The Town of Manila and Daggett County, 842 P.2d 907, 
908 Utah 19,92), the plaintiff owned a piece of property subject to an easement owned by Daggett 
32 
County that ran through plaintiffs propert). Daggett Count) had ownership rights over this 
easement allowing it to say who could or could not enter onto the land, subject to the terms of the 
easement. In Broadbent, 842 P.2d 908. Daggett County allowed the town of Manila to install an 
underground sewage line within the boundaries of the easement. The plaintiff sued for trespass. 
The Supreme Court of Utah found that, because Daggett County had acted within its scope of 
rights as the owner of the easement, plaintiff had no right to exclude Daggett County from its 
possession of the easement. Included in this right was Daggett County's right to exclude other 
parties from the easement or to allow others, like the town of Manila, to enter onto the property. 
The present case is comparable to Broadbent in that the dispute is over a control 
disagreement between two parties regarding the same piece of property. The Plaintiff and 
Defendant, David Allen, co-owned the property. Both parties had the right to possess the property 
and to exclude others from entering the property. However, Plaintiff had no right to exclude David 
Allen from the property because of his ownership interest. Likewise, David Allen has no right to 
exclude Plaintiff from the property because of her ownership interest. Furthermore, if one of the 
co-owners of the property gave consent to a third-party to enter the property, the other owner 
cannot exclude that person. Such a denial would be inconsistent with either party's ownership 
interest. David acted consistently with his ownership interest in the property when he gave consent 
to his mother, Susan, to enter the property. 
Surrounding jurisdictions have commented on the obviousness of the right of an owner of 
property to give permission to third parties to enter the property; "Consent is, of course, an 
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absolute defense to an action for trespass provided the consent is given by the possessor of the land 
. . . provided further that the acts of the party accused of the trespass do not exceed, or are not in 
conflict with, the purposes for which such consent was given." Belluomo v. Kake TV & Radio, 
Inc., 596 P.2d 832. 840 (Ct. App. Kansas 1979). 
Plaintiff has no right to exclude David from a property he owns. Furthermore, Plaintiff has 
no right to exclude a third-party invited onto the property by an owner, absent some prior contract 
stipulating that right to the owners of the property. Therefore, under Utah law. no trespass occurs 
where one owner of a piece of property excludes another owner of that same property, and with the 
same rights to that property, or any third party invited onto that property. 
Here, Plaintiffs entire recovery is predicated on Defendants Aliens' supposed "trespass." 
This trespass finding cannot stand as a matter of law. The trial court's instructions to the jury on 
the law of trespass were predicated on the legal error that Defendants could trespass against 
Plaintiffs property interest under the facts of this case. In this regard, the jury instructions were in 
error. 
POINT II THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
OF THE PROPERTY ISSUES HEREIN. 
Because Plaintiff and Defendant, David G. Allen, filed for divorce and obtained a final 
order, the court in the divorce action had continuing jurisdiction to resolve disputes between 
Plaintiff and Defendant over their decree and their marital property. Utah Code Annotated, 
§30-3-5. 
The trial court should have found that the divorce court had the only subject matter 
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jurisdiction over the dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants, regarding the marital home The 
marital home had been ordered sold. All of this really involves an argument over enforcement 
of a divorce decree-the sale of the property pursuant to the decree. 
For this reason, all claims and causes of action by Plaintiff should have been dismissed 
with prejudice, with the understanding Plaintiff always could seek to modify or enforce the 
decree of divorce in the divorce action. 
Further, the final order in the divorce case is the operative order regarding the real estate 
in issue; therefore, the divorce decree was res judicata as to that issue, and these proceedings 
should have been collaterally estopped by the divorce decree. 
The issues in dispute here were clearly addressed between Plaintiff and Defendant, David 
Allen, in the divorce lawsuit. All issues of what to do between said parties, regarding the 
property, were resolved in the divorce action and cannot be addressed here under the doctrine of 
res judicata. 
The doctrine of res judicata is designed to prevent parties to lawsuits from getting "a 
second bite of the apple." Plaintiff was permitted to sue here over issues pertaining to her 
former marital residence, when these issues had already been decided in the divorce. She was 
given a "second bite." This is clearly improper. 
This situation raises the possibility of conflicting court orders on the same topic between 
the same parties. This Court, theoretically, could enter an order about the marital residence 
conflicting with the divorce court's existing order or a future modification order in the divorce. 
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Such must be avoided. 
Because all the claims of Plaintiff violate collateral estoppel, jurisdiction and res judicata 
doctrines this case should have been dismissed. The trial court erred in failing to dismiss 
Plaintiffs claims. 
POINT III THE VERDICT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts abo\ e. it is clear that the Propert\ in issue was an 
extremely distressed property, difficult to sell. An extraordinary list of problems existed with the 
Property and occurred to the new purchasers (the McCandlesses) immediately after they occupied 
the Property. The Property would not qualify for FHA financing, and thus had to qualify with 
conventional and/or "B-loan" status. 
It could be argued that David Allen and/or his mother, Susan Allen, should have somehow 
found a better buyer for the Property. The problem is that a better buyer would likely not have 
accepted the Property. A buyer not exactly like the McCandlesses (who desperately wanted a horse 
property, were obviously quite handy at dealing with household repairs, and who were sufficiently 
financially distressed that they could not easily go elsewhere) were the only kinds of buyers who 
might be interested in this Property under these circumstances. 
It is absolutely undisputed from the evidence at trial that the Plaintiff herself never found 
her mythical better buyer to purchase this Property. It is absolutely undisputed that no other person 
other than the McCandlesses ever came forward and made an offer to purchase the Property. 
It is also absolutely undisputed that, but for David Allen taking control of the situation and 
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placing the McCandlesses in the Property, and but for the efforts of Susan Allen to bring cash to 
the closing, this sale would never have happened, and both Plaintiff and Defendant David Allen 
would have been worse off. They would like have owed a deficienc\ on the Property to the 
mortgage lien holders after foreclosure, as well as owing propert) taxes and utilities liens against 
the Property. They also would have suffered a foreclosure upon their credit rating. 
Elizabeth Mueller herself testified repeatedly that her sole goal through this entire process 
was simply to be out from under the Property - to have the mortgages satisfied, to have no further 
obligation with the Property, and to avoid the added disability- of a foreclosure upon her credit 
report and credit rating. All of this was accomplished for her. through no help of the Plaintiff and, 
in fact, in th6 face of her efforts to hinder the process. All of this was accomplished by her former 
husband, David Allen, and her former mother-in-law. Susan Allen. 
After having accomplished all of her stated purposes and stated goals in this case, Plaintiff 
continued to pursue this case through trial and has obtained a judgment against the Defendants 
Allen for a total of $55,000, most of it in the form of punitive damages. Under the totality of the 
evidence in this case, as marshalled above, there is absolutely no factual basis for the jury to have 
found any wrongdoing on the part of the Defendants Allen, whatsoever. It is clear that, since the 
evidence does not support the jury's finding in any regard, the \erdict must have been the result of 
passion or prejudice on the part of the jury7. This Court should reverse a jury verdict not supported 
by the evidence and should remand the case with instructions to the trial court to vacate the verdict, 
and/or to retrv the case. 
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At the very least, in the instant circumstance, the matter should be remanded to vacate, or in 
the alternative, to reassess the punitive damages award herein. 
There is no proof whatsoever that the Defendant David Allen or the Defendant Susan Allen 
acted with any animus toward the Plaintiff or with any kind of bad faith. On the contrary, the only 
evidence of animus in this case is that the Plaintiff hated her former husband. David Allen, and 
hated his mother more. Nothing whatsoever in the evidence demonstrates the kind of willful, 
deliberate or malicious behavior, or disregard for the rights of another, which would support any 
kind of award of punitive damages. 
It is clear that compensatory damages are intended to redress a plaintiffs loss, while 
punitive damages are aimed at the different purpose of deterence and retribution. In this case, the 
jury awarded a compensatory judgment against David G. Allen (reflected in paragraph 1 of the 
Judgment on Special Verdict, in the sum of $8,100.00. 
It is also clear that the jury awarded Plaintiff compensatory damages jointly and severally 
against David G. Allen and Susan S. Allen for trespass in the sum of $10,000.00, as referenced in 
paragraph 2 of the Order. (As noted in Point I above, no judgment should be permitted to stand in 
this case based upon trespass). 
The jury, in paragraphs 3 and 4, awarded judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant David G. Allen for $5,000 and against Defendant Susan S. Allen for $30,000. Due to 
the nature of the special verdict in this case, it is clear that an award of punitive damages, if it 
stands at all, must stand on the basis of the trespass found to have been committed by Defendants 
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against the real property rights of the Plaintiff Such cannot be sustained here. 
The United States Supreme Court noted in the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company v. Campbell et aL. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). that punithe damages pose an acute 
danger of arbitrary deprivation of property which is heightened when a decision maker is presented 
with evidence having little bearing on the amount that should be awarded. Thus, appellate courts 
must review punitive damages to consider the degree of reprehensibility of the alleged misconduct, 
the disparity between the actual or potential harm and the punitive damage award, and the 
difference between punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or 
imposed in comparable cases. 
In determining a Defendant's reprehensibility for purposes of assessing punitive damages, 
an appellate court must consider the reasonableness of the award, and in considering the reasonable 
of the award, an appellate court must consider: 
1. Whether the harm was physical rather than economic. In the instant case, Plaintiff 
makes absolutely no claim whatsoever of physical injury; 
2. Whether the tortious conduct evidenced by the defendant demonstrates an 
indifference to or a reckless disregard for the health or safety of others. In the instant case, there is 
absolutely no claim of indifference to the health or safety of other persons; 
3. Whether the conduct involves repeated actions or was an isolated incident. In the 
instant case, the only action complained of is a continuing course of conduct involving a single 
parcel of real property and continuing efforts to sell that property to one particular buyer, pursuant 
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to a direct order in a decree of divorce, and to avoid foreclosure. There is no indication of am 
intention on the part of the Defendants to continue in any similar course of conduct with other 
persons; and 
4. Whether am harm resulted from intentional malice, trickery or deceit, or mereh 
from an accident. In the instant case, it is arguable that no harm resulted to the Plaintiff 
whatsoever. Ironically, if she had had her way (or what she claimed at trial she had wanted), there 
would have been no tenant to pay any rent into the Property at all from April through December of 
2002. Thus, there would have been no money to extend the foreclosure past May of 2002, and the 
Property would have been foreclosed at that point in time. Had the Plaintiff received what she 
claims she wanted, her former in-laws would not have stepped forward with a loan of $14,000 to 
allow the McCandlesses to close the Property, and the Property would simply have been 
foreclosed. The Plaintiff is, ironically, in a much better position today (without consideration of 
the judgments entered in her favor) than she would have held had the McCandlesses been kept out 
of the Property, and had Defendant Susan Allen simply stayed out of the transaction altogether. 
Had Plaintiff truly received what she wanted, she would owe a deficiency judgment to her 
mortgage lienholder, would owe back property taxes for the real estate, would owe money to the 
utility company, and would have a foreclosure on her credit report. The Plaintiff is in a better 
position today than she would have occupied, but for the Defendants1 alleged misconduct. Thus, 
as there is no harm to the Plaintiff from the Defendants' conduct, it cannot be said that any harm 
resulted from intentional malice, trickery or deceit. Even assuming all of the evidence in the light 
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most favorable to Plaintiffs claim, as this Court is certainly required to do. the Defendants are. at 
best, guilty of hurting Plaintiffs feelings by eventually tning to sell the Propert\ without including 
her "in the loop," after she had reported Susan to her professional licensing board, to her employer, 
and had had her attorney threaten to sue them. This kind of conduct on the part of the Defendants 
is not such as should allow for punitive damages at all; 
5. It should be presumed in the law that a plaintiff has been made whole by 
compensatory damages, so punitive damages should be awarded only if the defendant's culpability 
is so horrible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence. 
Defendant David Allen, under the facts of this case, is merely "guilty" of attempting to follow the 
terms of his Decree of Divorce and selling the property to avoid foreclosure. His mother, Susan 
Allen, is merely "guilty" of attempting to achieve his goals of avoiding foreclosure and of bringing 
$14,000 of her own money to the table to do so. Under these circumstances, the compensatory 
damages alone (found in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the final order) are certainly more than adequate to 
compensate for any damages found by the jury, and the punitive damages are unnecessary because 
punishment and deterrence in this case are unnecessary. 
In the Campbell case, supra, the United States Supreme Court found that the insurance 
company's handling of claims against the Campbells did not merit any praise, but that a modest 
punishment would have satisfied the go\ ernmenf s legitimate objectives. Here, in the instant case, 
the conduct of the Defendants does not even merit a modest punishment. Here, the Defendant 
David Allen's only conduct is attempting to sell a highly distressed property under impossible 
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circumstances without cooperation from his former wife. Susan Allen's onh conduct is to attempt 
to assist her son in accomplishing these goals, and to put her own mone\ into the process. 
Further, the Campbell case makes clear that the courts may not allow the punishment of a 
defendant for conduct which may ha\ e been lawful when and where it occurred. As noted above, 
in the instant case, David Allen was specifically authorized and ordered by the Decree of Divorce 
to sell the Property. Nothing in his behavior is so outside the realm of reasonableness in selling 
this Property that it should be punished with anything more than compensator) damages. 
The sole basis for punitive damages, further, as against the Defendants Allen is their 
putative "trespass" upon the Property. As noted above, since David Allen's entry on the Property 
was always lawful. Pursuant to his title interest, and Susan Allen's activities with the Property 
were always with the blessing of a title owner (David Allen) and her understanding that she had the 
consent of the other title owner, none of her behavior can be found to have been unlawful when 
and where it occurred. The State, through these courts, has no legitimate concern in imposing 
punitive damages under the facts in this case, against either Defendant. Defendants concede that 
there is no concrete constitutional limit established in the Campbell decision, or elsewhere, on the 
ratio between harm or potential harm to the Plaintiff, and a punitive damages award. Defendants 
will also concede that the court in Campbell appears to have approved single digit multipliers as 
reasonable for punitive damages award. However, this does not absolve the Plaintiff from scrutiny 
of these punitive damages under the other criteria set forth in Campbell, and set forth in BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). Even if the punitive damages awarded are 
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grounded in a single digit multiplier, this Court must still apply all of the proper analysis. Under 
the facts of this case, the punitive damages award cannot stand as lawful or constitutional. 
In the instant case. Susan Allen was found to owe jointly and severally the sum of $10,000 
(or $5,000, if divided equally with her co-defendant) for compensator) damages for trespass. She 
was ordered to pay six times this sum. or $30,000, in punitive damages, a grosslx excessive 
punitive damage award given the totality of the compensatory award granted against Susan Allen, 
and given the totality of the circumstances. 
An additional guidepost for determination of the reasonableness of a punitive damages 
award is the difference between punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties 
authorized or imposed in comparable cases. As noted in the Campbell case itself, the most recent 
punitive damages award as of that 2003 decision, flowing out of the courts of the State of Utah, 
was a $10,000 punitive damages award for what the United States Supreme Court described as 
"grand fraud." Defendant Susan Allen here committed nothing so serious as the "grand fraud" 
described by the Supreme Court in the Campbell case. Surely, if "grand fraud" is worth $10,000 in 
punitive damages in the State of Utah as a comparable award. Defendant Susan Allen cannot be 
assessed three times that sum in this jurisdiction for these facts and circumstances. 
Further, the award of punitive damages in this case violates Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-18-1, et. seq, in that the damages awarded here are not based upon proof by clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the Defendants are the result of willful and 
malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
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indifference toward and disregard of the rights of others. The violation of this Utah statuton 
provision has occurred for all of the reasons cited in the foregoing analysis. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that the evidence does not support 
any of the judgments against the Defendants Allen. In the alternative, and at the very least, this 
Court should find that the punitive damages awards do not meet the criteria of the United States 
Supreme Court for assessment of punitive damages and are. therefore, unconstitutional as 
excessive and as a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the case should be remanded to the trial court to vacate the 
judgment as a matter of law. In the alternative, the case should be remanded to vacate the punitive 
damages awarded. In the alternative, the matter should be remanded for new trial. 
DATED this day of December, 2004. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS. P.C. 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
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This case was tried to the Court, before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, sitting with a 
jury, on January 27, 28, 29 and 30, 2004. Plaintiff, Elizabeth Ruth Mueller, was represented hy 
Gary A. Weston of the firm of Nielsen & Senior. Defendants, David G. Allen and Susan S. 
Allen, were represented by Mary C Corporon of the firm of Corporon & Williams. Defenaants, 
Randy N. McCandless and Halene McCandless, appeared pro se and without counsel. 
After commencement of trial. Defendant David G. Allen withdrew his counterclaim 
against the Plaintiff and the Court denied Plaintiff leave to introduce evidence with regard to the 
Judgment on Special Verdict (4 parts) @J 
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counterclaim. Upon the completion of the evidence, the Court further considered Plaintiffs 
motion in limine directed at Defendant Susan S. Allen's claim for abuse of process. Upon 
motion of the Plaintiff, the Court dismissed the claim with prejudice, treating the motion as one 
to dismiss and determining that neither law or evidence had been submitted sufficient to support 
the claim. Defendants David G. Allen and Susan S. Allen renewed their motion that the Court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Court had long before denied said Defendants' motion. 
Notwithstanding, the Court heard argument of counsel and again denied the motion. 
Having submitted issues to the jury for its special verdict relative to the First, Second and 
Third Claims for Relief of Plaintiffs complaint against Defendants and the Second and Third 
Causes of Action of Defendant Susan S. Allen's counterclaim against Plaintiff, and the jury 
having duly rendered its verdict on January 30, 2004; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with the special verdict of the jury, it is hereby 
ordered and adjudged: 
1. Plaintiff, Elizabeth Ruth Mueller, have and recover from Defendant, David G. 
Allen, the sum of Eight Thousand One Hundred Dollars ($8,100.00) as found by the jury. 
2. Plaintiff have and recover from the Defendants, David G. Allen and Susan S. 
Allen, jointly and severally, the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) as found by the jury. 
3. Plaintiff have and recover from the Defendant, David G. Allen, punitive damages 
in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) as found by the jury. 
4. Plaintiff have and recover from the Defendant, Susan S. Allen, punitive damages 
in the sum of Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) as found by the jury. 
•lSS2-OH?0-553f).VH':204.(X)l " - " 
5. Plaintiff have and recover from the Defendants, Randy N. McCandless and 
Halene VIcCandless, jointly and severally, the sum of Eight Thousand Five Hundred Fifty 
Dollars (S8.550.00), consisting of rental in the amount of Nine Hundred Dollars ($900.00) owing 
to Plaintiff for the period of time prior to Defendants McCandless unlawfully detaining 
possession of the property subject of the Plaintiffs complaint, and Seven Thousand Six Hundred 
Fifty Dollars (57,650.00) for unlawfully detaining possession, all as found by the jury. 
6. Plaintiff have and recover costs and disbursements as allowed by the Court. 
This judgment shall bear interest from and after its date at the rate provided in 
Section 15-1-4(3), UTAH CODE ANN. 
DATED this £ ' day of February, 2004. 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE 
AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. fyl^/lQ?//! 
Judge: 
The above-entitled matter came on before the court on Petitioner's Affidavit for Entry of 
Divorce Decree in accordance with Rule 4-913 Code of Judicial Administration. More than 
ninety days have passed since this matter was filed with the Court or Petitioner's motion to waive 
the 90-day waiting period was granted. The Court, having found and entered it Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and being otherwise fully advised, it is hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
That the Pe^tioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Respondent, such to 
become final upon signature and entry herein. 
1. During the course of the marriage relationship, the parties have acquired certain 
items of personal property. Said personal property of the parties is awarded as follows: 
Description of Item 
1986 Chevy S10 pickup 
Suzuki 250 motorcycle 
bedroom set 
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big screen tv 
vcr 
refrigerator 
washer and dryer 
all Household items 









All other personal property should be divided as the parties have already divided it 
2. During the course of the marriage, the parties have acquired certain debts and 
obligations. Each party is ordered to assume and pay the debts and hold the other harmless from 
liability as follows: 
To Whom Debt is Owed 
1 Discover Card 
Description of Debt 
Credit card 
Debt Becomes Sole 
Responsibility of 
Respondent 
All other debts are the responsibility of the person incurring the debt. 
3. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired the following real property: 
a. A home located at 13408 S. 1300 West, Riverton, UTAH 84065 more 
particularly described by the following legal description- Lot 1, Silcox Meadows 
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>niine Court Assistance Program 
Sub. 
7842-2385 7947-0892 7971-0369 8294-1736 
b The property shall be sold as soon as reasonably practicable and the 
proceeds of the sale applied as follows 
1 First, to pay expenses of sale, 
2 Second, to retire any and all mortgages and liens, 
3 Third, to pay all marital debts and obligations, 
4 Last, any balance remaining shall be divided equally between the 
parties. 
4. Neither party should be awarded alimony from the other. 
5. The parties have acquired no interest in any pension or profit sharing plan during the 
course of the marriage. 
6. There are no children at issue in this marriage. 
7. Neither the Petitioner nor the Respondent has received or is receiving public 
assistance from the State of Utah. 
8. Prior to any Petition being filed to change any provision of the final Decree of 
Divorce, the parties must attempt to resolve the issue through mediation. 
9. Respondent is restored the use of the fonner name of Elizabeth Ruth Mueller. 
DATED this 
9/22/2001 Decree of Divorce and Judgment Page 28 
miine Court Assistance Program 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
On this da}' of , . a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Decree of Divorce and Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid or delivered to 
Respondent at 13408 S 1300 West, Riverton, Utah 84065 
Petitioner Signature 
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30-3-4 HUSBAND AND WIFE 8 
the action. The order may include provision for costs of the 
action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the 
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no 
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party 
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may 
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the 
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other 
party and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the 
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of 
the action or in the final order or judgment. 2001 
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affi-
davit — Sealing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the 
petitioner or petitioner's attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default 
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the 
cause. If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the 
respondent, evidence to support the decree may be sub-
mitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the ap-
proval of the court. 
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or 
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both 
parties have attended the mandatory course described in 
Section 30-3-11.3, and have presented a certificate of 
course completion to the court. The court may waive this 
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of 
the parties, if it determines course attendance and com-
pletion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the 
best interest of the parties. 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held 
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by 
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The 
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter 
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree 
after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's 
affidavit. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by 
order of the court upon the motion of either party. The sealed 
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order 
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or 
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office 
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied 
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full 
access to the entire record. This sealing does not apply to 
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 1997 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 1990 
30-3-5. Disposit ion of property — Maintenance and 
health care of part ies and children — Divi-
sion of debts — Court to have cont inuing 
jurisdict ion — Custody and parent-time — 
Determination of al imony — Nonmeritorious 
petit ion for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the 
following m every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance 
for the dependent children; 
(O pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible 
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties of the parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respec-
tive creditors or obligees, regarding the court's divi-
sion of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding 
the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(hi) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance 
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an order 
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subse-
quent changes or new orders for the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and 
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters 
related to children born to the mother and father after entry of 
the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modifica-
tion. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and 
visitation rights of grandparents and other members of 
the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for 
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an 
order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a 
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace 
officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation 
schedule entered under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-
time provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court 
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court 
determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a 
parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a 
grandparent or other member of the immediate family pursu-
ant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation or parent-time 
right has been previously granted by the court, the court may 
award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney 
fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because 
of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered 
visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following fac-
tors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipi-
ent spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; 
JUDICIAL CODE 78-18-2 
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ILT tv of the state, its political subdivisions, or the 
L ther from suit are only waived with respect to a 
Ifrom a nuclear incident 
I accordance with Title 63, Chapter 30d, Govern-
1 Immunity Act of Utah, or 
Ihen brought by a person suffering h a r m 
Conduct of the person suffering harm is not a 
Lability except that this section does not preclude 
'$ based on 
he claimant's knowing failure to mitigate damages 
i
 t 0 any injury or damage to the claimant or the 
nts property, or 
m incident involving nuclear material tha t is know-
md wrongfully caused by the claimant 
>erson may collect punitive or exemplary damages 
[chapter 2004 
{Determination of causat ion — Compensat ion 
J allowed. 
fsation of radiological injury from a nuclear incident 
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CHAPTER 18 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS 
Basis for punitive damages awards — Section 
inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of 
award with state 
Punitive damages — Notification procedure 
Drug exception 
Basis for punitive damages awards — Section 
inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of 
award with state. 
fk) Except as otherwise provided by s tatute , punitive 
amages may be awarded only if compensatory or general 
images are awarded and it is established by clear and 
gjnvincmg evidence that the acts or omissions of the 
>rtfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or mten-
omally fraudulent conduct, or conduct tha t manifests a 
{bowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disre-
'ard of, the rights of others 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and stan-
lards of conduct of Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any 
iaim for punitive damages arising out of the tortfeasor s 
operation of a motor vehicle or motorboat while voluntar-
*y intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or 
combination of alcohol and drugs as prohibited by Section 
416 44 
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78 11-15 or 
78 11 16 regarding shoplifting is not subject to the prior 
award of compensatory or general damages under Sub-
section (l)(a) whether or not restitution has been paid to 
the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under 
Section 78 11 15 or 78 11 16 
) Evidence of a party s wealth or financial condition shall 
admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive 
iages has been made 
*) (a) In any case where punitive damages are awarded, 
the judgment shall provide that 50% of the amount of the 
punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall after an 
allowable deduction for the payment of attorneys fees and 
costs be remitted by the judgment debtor to the state 
treasurer for deposit into the General Fund 
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection (3) an allow-
able deduction for the payment of attorneys fees and 
costs' shall equal the amount of actual and reasonable 
attorneys fees and costs incurred by the judgment credi 
tor minus the amount of any separate judgment awarding 
attorneys fees and costs to the judgment creditor 
(c) The state shall have all rights due a judgment 
creditor until the judgment is satisfied, and stand on 
equal footing with the judgment creditor of the original 
case in securing a recovery 
(d) Unless all affected parties, including the state, 
expressly agree otherwise or the application is contrary to 
the terms of the judgment, any payment on the judgment 
by or on behalf of any judgment debtor, whether voluntary 
or by execution or otherwise, shall be applied in the 
following order 
(l) compensatory damages, and any applicable at-
torneys fees and costs, 
(n) the initial $20,000 punitive damages, and fi-
nally 
(m) the balance of the pumtive damages 2004 
78-18-1.5. Punitive damages — Notification procedure. 
(1) Whenever it appears from a return of a jury verdict in 
any court jury trial or from entry of a finding or order m any 
court bench tnal , that punitive damages have been awarded to 
the plaintiff in a court action, the clerk of the court shall 
immediately notify the attorney general and state treasurer of 
the verdict, finding, or order The notice shall contain 
(a) the names of both parties to the action, and then: 
attorneys, 
(b) the case number, and 
(c) the location of the court 
(2) In addition to the notice required m Subsection (1) of 
this section, the clerk of the court shall notify the attorney 
general and the state treasurer within five days after entry of 
a judgment award of pumtive damages The notice shall 
contain 
(a) the name of the party and his attorney, against 
whom the judgment was ordered, 
(b) the amount of the judgment, and 
(c) the date on which the judgment was entered 2002 
78-18-2. Drug exception. 
(1) Punitive damages may not be awarded if a drug causing 
the claimant's harm 
(a) received premarket approval or licensure by the 
Federal Food and Drug Administration under the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U S C Section 301 et 
seq or the Public Health Service Act, 42 U S C Section 
201 et seq, 
(b) is generally recognized as safe and effective under 
conditions established by the Federal Food and Drug 
Administration and applicable regulations, including 
packaging and labeling regulations 
(2) This limitation on liability for punitive damages does 
not apply if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that 
the drug manufacturer knowingly withheld or misrepresented 
information required to be submitted to the Federal Food and 
Drug Administration under its regulations, which information 
was matenal and relevant to the claimant's harm 1989 
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